Bunyan Um Marsoos: Cyber-Kinetic Warfare Explained

In the early hours of 10 May 2025, Pakistan launched an operation famously known as Bunyan um Marsoos in retaliation to the Indian unprovoked air strikes aimed at destroying targets inside Pakistan. The symbolic name was extracted from the Quran’s Surah As-Saff 61:4, defining it as “a solid cemented structure." However, the name extended beyond symbolic practice after it was blended into the Operational Doctrine, reflected through the combination of cyber-kinetic warfare tactics.

Pakistan’s follow-up to the Bunyan um Marsoos response did not simply adopt a kinetic retaliation as per the conventional textbook of warfare. Rather, it redefined the rules of engagement with a high-temperament demonstrating multi-domain operation (MDO) that combined cyber, electronic warfare (EW), space-enabled ISR, swarm drones, precision missiles, and conventional air power operating as interlocked layers of a single system. 

The Pakistani adversary escalated in early May 2025 with a ‘Narrative Pretext’ of the 22 April Pahalgam incident, followed by a kinetic escalation that created a live laboratory to demonstrate how cyber operations feature incident framing, information gatekeeping, and narrative building that translated into a proper kinetic battleground.

The Strategic Context

India’s shift to cyber-kinetic warfare in multi-domain operations was marked by launching “Operation Sindoor." The Indian combination of multi-domain capabilities involved the use of cyber technology and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) in synergy with the tri-services put forth against the alleged terror infrastructure inside Pakistan. India linked the Pahalgam Narrative through information operations via Indian media sources, which was propagated to pursue PM Modi's hardline position against Pakistan regarding suspected “cross-border terrorism," aiming to uphold the promise of “Diplomatic Isolation." 

Pakistan, on the other hand, retaliated with a calibrated and synchronized cyber offensive with a designated name, Operation Divine Bytes, directed at adversaries’ national installations, including Air Force systems, railway infrastructure, and power grid systems, disabling their surveillance grids with the objective of dismantling their command-and-control system. Operations conducted by Pakistan showcased a multi-dimensional approach to disrupt the enemy's OODA loop by integrating psychological operations PSYOPS with tactical operations. In the cognitive operations, it deceived the enemy by projecting a false Order of Battle (ORBAT) through orchestrated social media campaigns showing deployments. The Operation Bunyan Um Marsoos definitely provided a modern orientation to the Pakistani tri-services to operate in a multi-layered ecosystem for the battlefield. 

In an already fragile South Asian theater, the first time such a unique battlefield contestation was witnessed was that it combined non-kinetic cyber aspects such as information operations and PSYOPS in parallel to conventional operations in sustaining conflict between the region’s two major rivals. As per Indian sources, an Indian retired Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Chauhan is reported to have said that Op Sindoor was a multi-layered operation, largely non-contact warfare, involving both cyber and space, with a larger interoperability required.

How Cyber-Kinetic Warfare Was Integrated in the Threat Domain

India instrumentalized its cyber campaign, mobilizing hacktivist actors, such as the Indian Cyber Force, the Indian Cyber Defender, Cyber Warriors India, etc., reportedly launching attacks that targeted Pakistan’s government-based digital infrastructure. The targets comprised Oil & Gas Development Company Limited, Federal Board of Revenue of Pakistan, Habib Bank, etc. The Indian focus was on ensuring digital resilience and defending Indian cyberspace, rather than engaging in a sustainable offensive cyber operation.

The live conflict exercises displayed how non-state actors could be mobilized alongside a broader national security response during active military conflicts. Although it did effectively mobilize hacktivist groups to launch coordinated attacks against Pakistani government-based infrastructure, the overall utility of these attacks remained ambiguous to fulfill retribution.

The cyber offensive launched by Pakistan became a central component of the operational front, enabling information operations to deteriorate Indian logistical operations. The false military deployment projection of ORBAT was translated into an organized social media campaign to amplify perceptions with an objective to deceive the adversary, which impacted its situational awareness and operational clarity. 

Moreover, a preemptive non-kinetic cyber response launched by PAF’s Cyber Force targeted infrastructure nodes across India, degrading electric grids within the IIOJK sector. At the same time, PAF’s Electronic Warfare assets launched a coordinated electronic attack as per the mission requirements, disrupting the Rafale formation’s data link and reducing their operational awareness. Through synchronized employment of non-kinetic capabilities, Pakistan neutralized the emerging threat, forcing India’s premier air force assets to call off further kinetic escalation. It was envisioned by Pakistan’s Air Chief Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, whose thought leadership prepared the niche air power for conflicts where cyber integration would act as critically as conventional combat strength.

Future lessons drawn

Bunyan and Marsoos demonstrated how modern conflicts extended beyond aircraft, missiles, and conventional military formations into cyberspace and the informational ecosystem. It was observed that cyber activity plays a complementary role to military operations in multi-domain operational settings.

The 2025 conflict therefore proves as a regional textbook example for understanding cyber-kinetic warfare characterized by changing conflict landscapes in the South Asian environment. Its significance is not limited to simultaneous use of different technologies but also to the growing dependence of military operations on informational flows and electronic systems influencing command-and-control architecture.

Henceforth, the conflict demonstrated that cyber and kinetic domains are interconnected but not interchangeable. The deciding factor for future conflicts may not only be the quantitative strengths of aircraft, missiles, or drones but also the ability to maintain integrated networks, operational awareness, and information management.